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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: THE RESILIENCE OF
THE AMERICAN MODEL
William D. Araiza*

I. The American Model
Several characteristics of the American economic model influence American
free speech law. Perhaps most obvious is the model’s faith in the
unregulated market to produce optimal results. In the context of free
expression, this faith is reflected in the famous metaphor of ‘the marketplace
of ideas’, according to which the largely unregulated competition of ideas in
the public square yields truth, as better ideas gain adherents and triumph over
less worthy ones. The marketplace metaphor – concentrating as it does on
the general social benefits of speech, as opposed to the benefits accorded the
speaker – favors protection of corporate speech as an additional competitor
for the public’s ultimate approval in the latter’s search for truth.
Interestingly, it bears noting, if only briefly, that the current Court appears
poised to embrace corporate speech even under a more speaker-centered
theory of free speech. At oral argument in Citizens United Chief Justice
Roberts, among others, questioned the argument that corporations were
single-mindedly devoted to profit-making. He suggested instead that such
entities, motivated by their shareholders, might have opinions about a diverse
array of topics and a desire to express views on them. While the Chief Justice
stopped short of embracing the idea that corporations enjoy self-fulfillment
from speaking, this slight movement toward anthropomorphising them
would allow the Court to paint them as simply another participant in
democratic debate, possessing all the motives other speakers possess, rather
than as entities whose political speech is motivated by a single instrumental
concern for profit maximisation.
Return, though, to the marketplace theory of speech. In American campaign
finance jurisprudence this unadulterated faith in expression – or rather, in
citizens’ response to expression – is reflected in the Court’s growing
skepticism about the argument that corporate political speech risks
corrupting the political process by skewing debate. Most notably, Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990)
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derided the idea that government had a legitimate interest in ensuring that
speech occurred only in rough proportion to the popular support enjoyed by
the ideas it conveyed, calling it, in a play on the equality principle of ‘one
man, one vote’, an “illiberal free speech principle of ‘one man, one minute.’”
It is perhaps on the topic of corporate speech’s potential to distort political
discourse that the current Court’s evolution has been most remarkable. In
1982, in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, the
Court unanimously concluded that the economic advantages provided by the
corporate form gave corporations unique power that justified special
regulation of corporate campaign activities. Four years later, in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) (1986), five members of
the Court recognised these distortive effects but held that they did not justify
regulation of a non-profit corporation that refused contributions from
business corporations; the four dissenters would have allowed the
government to regulate even those entities. Four years after MCFL, six
Justices in Austin held that those distortive effects justified regulation of
corporations’ speech endorsing or attacking candidates for office. The fact
that, as of this writing, the Court is now on the edge of deregulating
corporate political speech illustrates the extent of this turnabout and the
Court’s skepticism about market distortion.
Following from this faith in unlimited expression is deep skepticism about
government attempts to regulate speech in the name of equality. In the
general business context this skepticism is evident in the enthusiastic
American embrace of market relationships and outcomes and corresponding
suspicion of wealth-transfer programs. In the speech context, this same
skepticism is evident in the Court’s emphatic and continuing rejection, as
illegitimate, of a speech equalisation rationale for campaign finance
regulation. This rejection is not a product of any evolution on the modern
Court; at least since the seminal case of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) the Court has
rejected the legitimacy of this justification for regulating political speech.
Finally, in perhaps the clearest link between the American model of business
regulation and free speech, the Court has shown increasing skepticism of
rationales for regulation of corporate speech that turn on a desire to protect
shareholders. The basic idea is that shareholders have their own free speech
interests in remaining free from involuntarily subsidissing corporate speech
by having corporations they invest in use their general treasury funds for
speech. Justice White forcefully advocated this idea in his dissenting opinion
in First National Bank v. Bellotti (1978), the case that established at least a
general right of corporations to engage in some political speech. In
subsequent years, a majority of the Court embraced Justice White’s principle
in MCFL and Austin, discussed above.1 Since then, however, the idea has

Because Bellotti dealt with a complete prohibition on corporate speech with regard to a
referendum, the Court in MCFL and Austin was able to distinguish that case on the ground
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come under significant attack. In the oral argument in Citizens United, Chief
Justice Roberts and others expressed palpable skepticism about this
shareholder-protection rationale, largely due to its paternalistic nature. One
can discern a clear link between that skepticism and a more generalised
rejection of government regulation of the market aimed at protecting
shareholders and other participants.
II. The Limits of the Model
The limits of the American model of business regulation have become
increasingly obvious over the last several years. Since this is a paper about
expression and not business regulation these limits need not be examined in
detail. However, as they relate to expression, suffice it to say that the current
financial crisis has called into severe doubt Americans’ (and others’) faith that
an unregulated market reliably generates optimal outcomes. Moreover,
suspicion that the players at the apex of the financial pyramid will somehow
survive the crisis far better than average stakeholders may generate more
support for government regulation that seeks to protect such stakeholders.
Neither of these dynamics directly translates into public opinion about
restrictions on corporate political speech, let alone judicial opinion about the
constitutionality of such restrictions. At the same time, however, one should
not minimise the extent to which empirical facts about business operations
may provide an overall backdrop to judicial determinations about the
importance of governmental interests justifying such restrictions. In the two
seminal campaign finance cases, Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission (2003), the Court cited empirical facts about
campaign finance abuses to justify upholding campaign finance regulations.
Contemporary revelations about market manipulations and abuses of trust
may well provide some counteracting force to the current Court’s libertarian
push toward broader political speech rights for corporations.
Still, despite the current economic crisis, characteristics more closely
associated with American law and society may continue to keep its free
expression law closely aligned with the more libertarian approach. Perhaps
most fundamentally, the individualistic nature of Americans’ self-perception
keeps American free speech law from trending toward the more regulationaccepting, communitarian approach taken by many other western
democracies. This characteristic arguably affects American free speech law
on issues as disparate as the protected status of group libel or racial or
religious ‘hate speech’ and regulation of the mass media, as well as the
acceptability of a speech equalisation rationale for restrictions on corporate
political speech. It should not be surprising, then, that American law on all of
these free speech issues varies considerably from the law of other advanced
democracies.
that the latter cases considered limitations, but not prohibitions, on corporate speech in the
context of candidate elections, not referendum campaigns.

58

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

2009

The nature and history of authoritative sources of American speech law also
feed the American skepticism about such restrictions. Most notably, the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is framed as an absolute prohibition on
speech restrictions. The practical necessity for some speech restrictions has
always contradicted the idea that the First Amendment’s command that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” in fact
enshrines an absolute rule. Still, courts interpreting that command in light of
practical realities have attempted to maintain the purity of that command by
simply excising, as a matter of original meaning, some expression (for
example, obscenity) from “the freedom of speech” protected by the First
Amendment. When that tack has proved impossible, courts have insisted that
speech restrictions either be content-neutral or narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest; both of these formulas aspire to avoid
explicit balancing of speech and other goals, in the hope of maintaining the
purity of the Constitution’s command. This imperative has also led, perhaps
less convincingly, to attempts to define some expression as simply not
speech, despite its obvious expressive quality.
These moves, whatever their justification in constitutional history or logic,
reveal a fundamental difference between American free expression law and
the free expression law of other western democracies. The absolutist nature
of the First Amendment, both as drafted and as interpreted by American
courts, stands in stark contrast to the proportionality and interest-weighing
explicitly embraced by a wide variety of other advanced western
constitutional regimes. More fundamentally, the more hospitable reception
other nations have accorded to government intrusion into private lives in the
service of communal well-being contrasts with the generally more libertarian
American approach.
Perhaps equally important in understanding this phenomenon is the absence,
in American history, of a significant internal threat to democracy. This happy
incident of the American story may play a role in the faith its law and people
possess in the benign power of speech and, conversely, their unwillingness to
accept governmental intrusion for the sake of protecting democracy. The
differing reactions to Nazi speech in the United States and postwar Germany
present only the starkest example of the power of a nation’s history to spark
different levels of appreciation for the dark, as well as the benign, potential
of speech.
Flowing from the American faith in unregulated speech is faith in listeners’
ability to sift truth from falsity. Justice Scalia’s derisive characterisation of the
majority in Austin as embracing the idea that “too much speech is an evil that
the democratic majority can proscribe” can only be understood as an
endorsement of the idea that listeners have the capacity to accept or reject
ideas based on their intrinsic merits, and not on how frequently or cleverly
those ideas are presented. This faith has consequences. Justice Scalia’s view
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does not necessarily imply rejection of a political equality justification for
limits on political speech. However, it is only a relatively short progression to
that further step: if the electorate is capable of accurately evaluating a
political message regardless of how often it is repeated in the media, then
nobody is denied an equal opportunity to participate in the political process
simply because someone else can speak more. Conversely, however, if
political outcomes can be distorted by inequalities in speech opportunities,
then the right to equal participation in politics would seem to require, or at
least benefit from, government action to ensure equality in political speech.
The assumptions underlying the American approach to these issues contrast
starkly with those of other nations, whose restrictions on political speech are
based on equality concerns. For example, British law’s restrictions on
purchasing broadcast time to communicate political messages reflect concern
about the skewing of political debate allegedly caused by unequal quantities
of speech. Indeed, sometimes a concern for equality can lead to unequal
distribution of communications resources. In Canada, for example, the
election law grants parties free broadcast time during election periods,
allocated based in large part on their existing political strength, and restricts
purchase of additional time outside of that framework. This system, of
course, leads to massive disparities in the amount of broadcast time available
to the various parties. However instantiated, any such system of allocations
and restrictions necessarily supposes that, in Justice Scalia’s words, “too
much speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe,” or,
perhaps more to the current point, that relative allocations of speech are
more important to an informed electorate than absolute amounts.
Are restrictions on corporate political speech acceptable? The answer turns
largely on one’s position on the ‘absolute-amount-versus-relative-allocation’
issue set forth in the last paragraph, with perhaps some additional
consideration for one’s view about the workability and fairness of any official
system of speech restrictions and allocations. If one believes that political
speech in itself is a good thing, regardless of its source and its relative
allocation, then one should not be concerned if speech comes in unequal
amounts from proponents of different views. Moreover, one would not be
concerned if that speech came from non-members of the polity, such as
foreigners and non-natural entities such as corporations. Simply put, if the
value lies in the speech itself, then its origins should be irrelevant.
On the other hand, if speech is valuable because it reflects, in rough
proportions, the pre-existing – and thus, presumably, undistorted – views of
the electorate, then one should be concerned about both allocating speech in
rough proportion to the political support it enjoys and ensuring that it
emanates from members of the polity. For example, the Canadian
government has defended its practice of allocating broadcast time among its
parties in proportion to their electoral popularity on the ground that it is
important for such allocations to favor broad-based national parties that have
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a reasonable chance of winning the election and forming the government.
Similarly, if one is concerned that repetition of speech has the effect of
drowning out other voices, then restrictions may be appropriate in the
service of preventing the skewing of debate, and hence outcomes.
III. Prospects for the Future
While it is always hazardous to predict the outcome of court cases, the oral
argument in Citizens United suggests that an emerging majority of
conservative justices will continue to put pressure on the current regime of
limited toleration of limits on corporate political speech. This development
means that American free speech law will remain at odds with that of its
advanced democratic counterparts around the world. This divergence is
probably of no great concern to many members of the Court, given their
suspicion of borrowing from abroad when interpreting American
constitutional law.
Perhaps more significant, then, is the potential contradiction within American
law, between increased public acceptance of stringent government regulation
of business’s general operations, and the Court’s push in the opposite
direction with regard to the political speech engaged in by those same
entities. Of course it must never be forgotten that, at least under one
understanding, the U.S. Constitution draws a sharp distinction between
regulation of businesses and regulation of the speech in which businesses
engage. Most notably, while the Constitution imposes few limits on
government regulation of commercial activity it severely limits government
regulation of speech proposing that activity.2 There is certainly no doctrinal
inconsistency between tolerating government regulation of the economic
marketplace and rejecting government regulation of the speech marketplace.
Conclusion
Regulation of business and regulation of the speech in which businesses
engage raise some similar issues, such as the quality of the policy results
produced by an unregulated regime and the ability of smaller stakeholders to
protect their own interests (economic or speech) when large institutions so
dominate the landscape. Changing perceptions of the correct answers to
these questions in the context of general economic regulation may well
See, for example, Justice Thomas’s remark in his dissenting opinion in Glickman v.
Wileman Brothers and Elliott (1997): “Although the Constitution may not ‘enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,’ and thus the Government has a considerable range of
authority in regulating the Nation's economic structure, part of the Constitution – the First
Amendment – does enact a distinctly individualistic notion of the freedom of speech, and
Congress may not simply collectivise that aspect of our society, regardless of what it may
do elsewhere.” The reference to Herbert Spencer, and the internal quotation, are both from
Justice Holmes’s classic dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905), where Holmes dissented
from the Court’s second-guessing of a law mandating a maximum 60-hour work week for
bakers.
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influence perceptions of those answers in the context of speech regulation.
Thus, it remains unclear whether Americans will continue to accept the
discrepancy between the constitutional status of corporate economic
regulation and corporate speech regulation. Should they come to question
the emerging laissez-faire approach to corporate speech they may find lessons
in how other advanced democracies approach the issue, now that the
American model has revealed its weaknesses.
- The Amsterdam Law Forum is an open access initiative supported by the VU University Library -

62

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

2009

